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Abstract
We show how Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems have an analog in quantum the-
ory. Go¨del’s theorems imply endless opportunities for appending axioms to arith-
metic, implicitly showing a role for an entity that writes axioms as logically un-
determined strings of symbols. There is an analog of these theorems in physics,
to do with the set of explanations of given evidence. We prove that the set of
explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite, thereby showing how con-
tact between theory and experiment depends on activity beyond computation and
measurement—a physical activity of logically undetermined symbol handling.
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1. Introduction
People writing and reading symbols act as symbol handlers, for example in
making use of numerals and symbols of an alphabet. In mathematical logic, sym-
bol handling has attracted serious attention, notably with Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems. By analyzing the system of symbols involved in the most elemen-
tary branch of mathematics, the arithmetic of natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . , Go¨del
proved that there are always questions in mathematical logic, the answers to which
are logically undetermined, calling for additional axioms which in turn generate
more such questions [1]. Then came Turing’s formulation of the concept of com-
putability in terms of symbol handling, leading to his demonstration of the preva-
lence of functions of natural numbers that are uncomputable. Go¨del and Turing’s
attention to the manipulation of symbols in mathematics opened a field of inquiry
into logically undetermined aspects of mathematics, with implications for other
fields of endeavor that make use of mathematics, including physics.
In physics, strings of symbols express both evidence and the formulas by
which that evidence is explained, formulas that lead to predictions. Recently
came the recognition that the expression in symbols has interesting implications
for physics [2, 3]. In earlier work, we proved that quantum-theoretic explanations
of given evidence are logically undetermined by the evidence, leading to the ne-
cessity of guesswork in arriving at an explanation. In the next section we prove a
stronger proposition: the set of explanations that fit given evidence is uncountably
infinite. Implications of the proposition follow. As discussed in Sec. 3, a corol-
lary to the proof implies an endless open cycle in which symbol-handling agents
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guess explanations and test their implications. Sec. 4 discusses the notion of a
symbol handler as exercising capabilities to compute and to guess. To distinguish
between the ultimate reach of computation and other capabilities, we introduce
a theoretical symbol handler that has the full computational capacity of a Turing
machine. In the context of a Turing machine, as discussed in Sec. 5, the uncount-
able set of explanations has strong implications in relation to what can and cannot
be computed. Sec. 6 views agency as pervading the material world. In Sec. 7 we
make a few remarks toward future directions for investigation.
2. Uncountable set of explanations of given evidence
As represented in quantum theory, an experiment involves many trials, with
an outcome occurring for each trial. Eschewing saying what outcome will occur
at a particular trial, quantum theory speaks only of probabilities of outcomes.
In explaining probabilities of outcomes, one views a trial as consisting of the
preparation of a state, e.g. expressed by a density operator ρ, and a measurement,
expressed by a Positive-Operator-Valued Measure (POVM), here denotedM . For
some outcome space Ω, with Ω˜ a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, one then has for each
outcome ω ∈ Ω˜ a non-negative operator M(ω), the measurement operator for
outcome ω. Both the density operator and the measurement operator are operators
on some (finite- or infinite-dimensional) Hilbert space H. By the Born trace rule,
the explanation (ρ,M) implies a probability for the outcome ω:
Pr(ω) = tr[ρM(ω)]. (1)
The whole outcome space Ω is the union of all outcomes. By definition, Ω is an
element of the σ-algebra Ω˜, andM(Ω) = 1, the identity operator onH.
Here is the issue. Books on quantum mechanics teach us to calculate proba-
bilities from given states and measurement operators, using the Born trace rule;
however, experiments with unexpected results present the “inverse situation” (as
in quantum decision theory). One is given probabilities abstracted from evidence
on the workbench, and one seeks “blackboard” explanations in terms of states
and measurement operators. In practice, an investigator’s education and habits of
thought may limit the choice of explanations, but logic alone leaves open a vast
region of explanations that exactly fit the given probabilities.
Theorem: The set of inequivalent explanations that exactly fit given
probabilities is uncountably infinite.
3
Proof: The idea behind the proof is to exploit tensor products of Hilbert spaces.
For example, an experiment with two detectors can be explained using measure-
ment operators that are tensor products, one factor of the tensor product for each
detector. Ignoring outcomes of one detector coarsens the experiment; one explains
the remaining evidence by setting the measurement operator for the ignored fac-
tor to the identity operator. In this way a explanation of evidence is condensed
into a simpler explanation of a condensation of the evidence. This process can
be reversed: any explanation of evidence from an experiment can be seen as a
condensation of any of a multitude of possible extensions of the experiment. Such
an extension entails augmenting the Hilbert space H(0) by another Hilbert-space
factorH(1) to getH(0) ⊗H(1).
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we prove that for any expla-
nation there are always two more inequivalent explanations, as follows. Suppose
that Ω˜(0) is a σ-algebra of outcomes for an explanation of an experiment, and that
probabilities Pr(ω(0)) are abstracted from results for each outcome ω(0) ∈ Ω˜(0).
Suppose further that one is given an explanation (ρ(0),M (0)) with the operators
on a Hilbert space H(0) that exactly imply the given probabilities. Then there are
always two more inequivalent explanations that give the same probabilities. Both
of these explanations involve a tensor product Hilbert space ofH(0) with a second
factorH(1). The explanations for outcomeω(0) are
(
ρ(0) ⊗ ρ(1)1 ,M (0)(ω(0))⊗M (1)(Ω(1)
)
and
(
ρ(0) ⊗ ρ(1)2 ,M (0)(ω(0))⊗M (1)(Ω(1))
)
, where ρ
(1)
1 and ρ
(1)
2 are distinct den-
sity operators onH(1). Because of the equalityM (1)(Ω(1)) = 1(1), these explana-
tions are blind to the second factor of the density operator, which is why they give
the same probabilities as does the given explanation. But the two explanations are
inequivalent, because they extend to an expanded experiment which provides for
attending to two or more distinct outcomes in Ω˜(1), for which the two extended
explanations imply different probabilities.
Now for the second step. As a mathematical construct, the augmentation
by one more tensor-product factor can be repeated without end, resulting in a
set of mutually inequivalent explanations, one for each of the infinite sequences
j1, j2, . . .: (
ρ(0) ⊗
∞⊗
n=1
ρ
(n)
jn
,M (0)(ω(0))⊗
∞⊗
n=1
M (n)(Ω(n))
)
(2)
The explanations with the infinite sequence of factors differ independently for
each factor. Thus the set of explanations has the cardinality of the set of infinite
binary fractions, a set that by the Cantor diagonal argument is uncountable, mean-
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ing it cannot be mapped 1-to-1 to the set of natural numbers, or, less formally, that
it cannot be listed even on an infinitely extendable Turing tape. Expression (2)
displays an uncountable subset of the set of inequivalent explanations that match
a given evidence. It follows that the whole set of inequivalent explanations must
also be uncountable. Q.E.D.
Corollary: There is no logical ground to exclude any of the uncount-
able set of potential explanations of given evidence prior to additional
evidence not yet on hand.
Remarks:
1. The multiplicity of explanations has nothing to do with imperfections in the
fit between evidence and its explanation; as proved above, it holds even in
the ideal case in which one demands an exact fit. Requiring only an approx-
imate fit, as is common practice, makes room for even more explanations of
any given evidence.
2. Quantum-state tomography claims to determine a quantum state from evi-
dence. To this claim we respond that quantum state tomography assumes
that the measurement operators are known, and, by the Theorem, this knowl-
edge cannot be obtained from evidence alone. In addition, quantum state to-
mography assumes some finite dimension of the Hilbert space, a dimension
underivable from evidence.
3. It can also be noted that evidence is expressed by probabilities that are func-
tions of parameters; we think of parameter values as settings of knobs, such
as a knob by which to vary a magnetic field strength or a knob to vary the
angle of a polarizer. Then not only the evidence but also the density opera-
tor and the POVM depend on knob settings. The proof of the Theorem goes
through the same way for each knob setting[2, 4].
4. For the physicist struggling to come up with some explanation of unex-
pected evidence, worrying about the possibility of other explanations may
seem superfluous; yet being aware that something outside of logic is re-
quired to make an explanation liberates one from futile efforts to derive an
explanation by logic alone.
After introducing Turing machines, we will discuss implications of the un-
countability of the set of explanations of given evidence in more detail, but here is
a first hint. An impediment to assigning a suitable probability measure to the set
arises, because the set of explanations is both uncountable and devoid of a natural
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metric. The real numbers are uncountable but come with a metric, and the metric
allows for probability measures that in effect assign a probability not to a partic-
ular real number but to an interval of real numbers. (Intervals expressing values
of measurable variables are appropriate because two real numbers that are suffi-
ciently close are experimentally indistinguishable.) A countably infinite set re-
quires no metric in order for non-zero probabilities to be assigned to its elements,
because its elements can be ordered by natural numbers. For any 0 < r < 1, an
symbol-handling agent can assign a probability (1 − r)rn to the n-th element of
the countable set. (As probabilities must, these sum to 1.
In contrast to the metric structure of real numbers and the countability of nat-
ural numbers, explanations of given evidence are discrete and uncountable. They
are like infinite sequences of distinct digits. If a digit in one sequence differs from
a corresponding digit in another sequence, the sequences are distinct, regardless
of how far along the sequence the difference appears. Because of its discrete
topology on an uncountable set, we have the following.
Proposition 1: Any probability measure on the set of explanations
of given evidence must assign zero probability to all but a countable
subset of its elements.
By Prop. 1 and and the Corollary to the Theorem, we have
Proposition 2: Neither an explanation nor a probability measure on
explanations can be be logically determined by the evidence explained.
3. Open cycle of guessing and testing
Out of a potential for uncountable inequivalent explanations, physicists write
down particular explanations. By the Corollary, the writing of symbols that in-
troduce an explanation of given evidence takes something beyond logic and ev-
idence. This ‘something’ can reasonably be called a guess. The guess, neither
derived mathematically on the blackboard nor generated from an experiment on
the work bench, comes from “somewhere else.” Guessed explanations, expressed
in mathematical symbols, feed into the development of experimental devices and
into the design of future experiments. Different guessed explanations lead to dif-
ferent experimental designs, leading to different bodies of evidence that call for
more explanations and hence more guesses. Any particular explanation is essen-
tially certain to require revision when tested over enough of its extensions. We
thus arrive at
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Proposition 3: The regularities that physicists find in the material
world defy any final expression and any final explanation.
With Prop. 3, we see that quantum theory implies an endless evolution of physics
as an activity of symbol-handling agents “guessing and testing” in an open cycle
with no possibility of completion.
Attending to symbol handling clarifies a distinction between an occurrence
of an event of low probability and what we term a surprise. Via the Born trace
rule, an explanation assigns probabilities to a (possibly infinite) list of possible
outcomes. One can think of this list of possibilities as a string of symbols recorded
in some agent’s computer file. In this way we link the concept of possible to the
contents of an agent’s memory. In contrast, our dictionary defines possible as:
able to happen although not certain to . . . [5], without reference to an agent or to
any memory. By referencing possibilities to an agent’s list we define a surprise as
a reaction of an agent to an event not on the list of possibilities—the occurrence
of “an unknown unknown.” Historically, (as in the disaster at the Three-Mile
Island nuclear plant), people experience outcomes not on their lists of possibilities,
and they react to such outcomes, thereby experiencing surprise. (Experiencing
surprise is distinct from facing measurement uncertainty. Uncertainty, denotes a
spread in a probability distribution ensuing from some measurement model [6],
involving a list of possible outcomes, and not the introduction of a possibility not
in the list. Symbol-handling agents operating in the open cycle of guessing and
testing encounter surprises that call for revising their guesses and the explanations
that ensue from them; their assumptions evolve. In 2005 we wrote of “the tree of
assumptions”[2]:
Some guesses get tested (one speaks of hypotheses), but testing a
guess requires other guesses not tested. By way of example, to guide
the choice of a density operator by which to model the light emitted
by a laser, one sets up the laser, filters, and a detector on a bench to
produce experimental outcomes. But to arrive at any but the coars-
est properties of a density operator one needs, in addition to these
outcomes, a model of the detector, and concerning this model, there
must always be room for doubt; we can try to characterize the detec-
tor better, but for that we have to assume a model for one or more
sources of light. When we link bench and blackboard, we work in
the high branches of a tree of assumptions, holding on by metaphors,
where we can let go of one assumption only by taking hold of others.
7
4. Agency in physics
With the recognition of an open cycle of guessing and testing, the black-
board of theory and the workbench of experiment can no longer encompass all
of physics: there is a gap between them. In this gap, something else comes into
play, in order for symbol-handling agents (people or perhaps other organisms)
to link evidence to particular explanations. How, then, are we to think about a
physical world now recognized as inseparable from symbol-handling agents in
interaction with other parts of this world?
Based on the recognition that we ourselves as physicists act as symbol-handling
agents, and that we are organisms alive in the physical world, we wonder what
other aspects of behavior, especially biological behavior, might fruitfully be ex-
plained by invoking symbol-handling agents as elements of description. Symbols
and symbol-handling agents are terms of description available at widely varying
levels of detail. I may see myself as handling symbols, and I may inquire into
evidence of symbol handling on the part of mitochondria within my cells. We
propose that symbol-handling agents enter physical explanations.
Mainstream physics, emphasizing particles and fields, has no explicit vocabu-
lary for symbol handlers or their symbols. Recently, however, a crack opened in
physics for discussions of agents and symbols, for example in the work of Fuchs
and Schack [7, 8] and Briegel [9]. In these and other current examples, agency
and agent name a variety of notions with a complex history, partly in opposition
to obsolete notions of objectivity that traces back at least to Descartes [10]. Some
biologically-oriented notions of agents are introduced in biosemiotics [11] and in
code biology [12, 13, 14].
What capabilities are to be ascribed to a ‘symbol handling agent’? We think of
such an agent as taking steps, one after another, and as equipped with a memory.
Each “next step” of an agent is influenced both by the contents of its memory and
by an inflow of symbols from an environment that includes other agents, and also
by a logically undetermined “oracle” external to the agent [15]. Guesses come
from an agent interacting with an oracle, the workings of which we refrain from
trying to penetrate. How to elaborate this proposal remains open; presumably
investigators will conceive of a variety of expressions of ‘symbol-handlers for ap-
plications varying from descriptions of viruses to descriptions of humanmentality.
In order to distinguish between what can be computed and what must come
from beyond computation (as guesses from interaction with an oracle), we imag-
ine the extreme case of an symbol handler that, while open to guessing, possesses
maximal computational capacity. Thus we are unconcerned with practical lim-
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its on computing imposed by limits on memory or by limits on the rate at which
an symbol handler computes, leading us to assume that the symbol handler has
the ultimate computational capability of a Turing machine. The Turing machine,
however, requires modification to offer a place for guesses from interaction with
an oracle and for communication with other such machines.
Fortunately for our purposes, in a side remark to his 1936 paper, Turing briefly
introduced an alternative machine called a choice machine, contrasted with the
usual Turing machine that Turing called an a-machine:
If at each stage the motion of a machine . . . is completely determined
by the [memory] configuration, we shall call the machine an “au-
tomatic machine” (or a-machine). For some purposes we might use
machines (choice machines or c-machines) whose motion is only par-
tially determined by the configuration . . . . When such a machine
reaches one of these ambiguous configurations, it cannot go on un-
til some arbitrary choice has been made by an external operator. This
would be the case if we were using machines to deal with axiomatic
systems. [16].
We picture a symbol handler equipped with a c-machine modified to take part
in a communications network by transmitting symbols to other such machines.
We call the modified c-machine a Choice Machine. We posit that on occasion
an “oracle” writes a symbol onto the scanned square of the Turing tape of the
symbol-handler’s Choice Machine privately, in the sense that the symbol remains
unknown to other symbol handlers unless and until the symbol-handling agent
that receives the chosen symbol reports it to others [17]. There is no limit to the
number of symbols that the oracle can write, and we make no rule of separating
data from program, so that what comes from the oracle can influence both data
and programs.
5. Appreciating uncountability
While we previously linked agency to multiple explanations [3], now we have
the proof that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite.
The indefinitely extendable symbol-holding tape of the Choice Machine gives an
interesting way to appreciate this uncountable set, as follows. For a finite set,
one can write down numerical names for the elements, one after another: element
1, element 2, etc. For countably infinite sets one cannot quite do this, but one
imagines a correspondence of names of the elements of the set with the natural
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numbers. One thinks “as if” names of the elements could all be written one after
another on a Turing tape, without ever running out of symbol-holding squares of
the tape. A Turing machine, programmed to get to a the name of a particular
element, will always reach it.
By definition, an uncountable set cannot have the names of its elements writ-
ten on even an unlimited tape, so that even in the theoretical limit of unlimited
memory and unlimited computational speed, an agent’s Choice Machine cannot
be relied on to eventually arrive at every explanation that exhibits some property
of interest. To arrive an explanation or even a subset of explanations requires a
reach beyond what can be computed by any variety of Turing machine. Because
the set of potential explanations is uncountable, when you guess an explanation,
you do more than pick from a list: something is created.
Remarks:
1. Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem implies that arithmetic generates an
infinite list of questions, each answerable by an agent putting forth an an-
swer that inserts one of two axioms, extending arithmetic in an unending
structure of binary choices. Thus by the diagonal argument, the set of ex-
tended arithmetics is uncountable. Go¨del used a fixed countable system of
symbols to make his proof from which it follows that the set of extended
arithmetical systems is uncountable. Similarly, we use a fixed countable
system to prove that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncount-
able.
2. By definition, an axiom is logically undetermined and is thus a species of
a guess made by some agent. Recalling the metaphor of the ‘tree of as-
sumptions’, the axioms that settle Go¨del’s logically undecidable questions
represent uncountable branches (perhaps better said, branchlets) of that tree.
6. Is agency pervasive?
A major major fork in the tree of assumptions can now be seen. Physicists
exhibit agency, and if physicists are part of the material world then some physical
material is under the influence of agency. We now ask: is all physical matter
influenced by agency? Are the stars made out of only dead matter, which is to say,
are they uninfluenced by agency, or not? If the stars are shaped partly by agency,
that is, by acts of agents, agents that are by definition capable of uncomputable
behavior, a new area for investigation opens up. Habit in physics weighs against
this view, but that habit depends on the notion that although “now we see through
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a glass darkly,” there is some ultimate end picture toward which we approach. In
contrast, the implication of the proof of uncountable explanations of any given
evidence, along with the recognition of symbol-handling as part of the material
world, decides for the other major branch: a physical world pervaded by agency.
In a world pervaded by agency, the big-bang theory still serves to explain
a body of cosmological evidence; we do not criticize that explanation, but we
recognize that there is potentially an uncountable set of other explanations that
also explain the evidence. One no longer can hope to relate the world of physical
experience to a single system of logic, comparable to what Go¨del used to prove
the incompleteness theorems, but rather the world of physical experience is to
be seen as something for which explanations, like extended arithmetics, form an
uncountable set.
7. Discussion
Proven above is the Theorem that all explanations are necessarily open to test-
ing and to needs for revision, so that any path of inquiry remains uncloseably
open; there can be no final answers compatible with quantum mechanics. How is
one to respond? One is left with a question of faith. Is the conflict of quantum
theory with final answers something to respond to with despair or with joy? That
choice no science of which we know can resolve: it is up to the person.
For a next step along our path of inquiry, we plan to follow up on the ex-
pression of evidence and its explanations by flows of strings of symbols in cy-
cles of guessing and testing. It might be supposed symbols flow within some
fixed spacetime. On the contrary, however, we are interested in the establishment,
maintenance, and dissolution of flows symbols among agents as enabling an un-
countable set of other systems of spatio-temporal management, differing from the
spacetimes of special or general relativity, systems of spatio-temporal manage-
ment that accommodate to the circumstances in which the agents operate. For
example, animal behavior, as in E. Coli [18], frog vision [19], and depth vision of
praying mantis [20] come to mind as places to start to look for interesting systems
of spatio-temporal management.
Readers of an earlier draft offered several comments and criticisms deserving
of the following responses.
7.1. Non-triviality of tensor products
Is a density operator that is a tensor product trivial? One can always write a
density operator for each of two unrelated experiments as a tensor product with
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one factor for each experiment, and it is fair to call such a tensor product ‘trivial’;
however, products of density operators enter explanations non-trivially, for exam-
ple when two parameters of a single experiment enter distinct factors of a tensor
product of density operators. In that case a choice of a parameter can have an
effect that is unexpressed in a simpler explanation, but has a dramatic effect when
a tensor product is invoked in a more encompassing explanation.
For example, this situation occurs in the BB84 protocol for Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD), which relies on quantum uncertainty to claim security against
undetected eavesdropping. In BB84[21], Alice transmits a sequence of laser-
generated, single-photon light pulses to Bob, from which Bob and Alice extract a
key. For each pulse, Alice “sets a knob” to choose randomly among four types of
light pulses, each characterized by a polarization vector and a frequency spectrum.
If the spectra are identical, the experiment can be explained by a density operator
on the two-dimensional vector space of polarizations, as assumed in much of the
QKD literature. In a two dimensional space, there must be substantial overlap
among the four polarizations, forcing substantial uncertainty on any eavesdrop-
per’s measurements. The claim of QKD security depends on this uncertainty.
However, a physically more informed explanation accounts for light frequency,
for which it introduces another factor, of infinite dimension, so that the density
operator becomes a tensor product of a density operator expressing polarization
with a density operator expressing the frequency spectrum of the light pulse. By
“setting a knob”, Alice determines both a polarization angle and a frequency.
The simpler explanation, employing the density operator on the 2-dimensional
polarization space, gives an adequate description of eavesdropping under the con-
dition that the eavesdropper makes no use of frequency discrimination. But the
tensor-product explanation is critical to showing what a better equipped eaves-
dropper can learn. In some popular implementations, each type of light pulse
comes from a different laser. It is readily shown that if the lasers are imperfectly
aligned in frequency, the overlaps among the four light states approach zero, so
that the QKD system is seen have no security at all[22].
7.2. Entanglement
Here is an example of two explanations of given evidence, the first of which in-
volves no entanglement, while the second involves an an entangled state. Consider
a simple case of evidence with two outcomes: ω
(0)
1 and ω
(0)
2 , and with probabilities
given, for some 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, by
Pr(ω
(0)
1 ) = a, and Pr(ω
(0)
2 ) = 1− a. (3)
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These probabilities accord with an explanation α involving a Hilbert space of just
two real dimensions,H(0) = R2, with a basis {|x(0)〉, |y(0)〉}, so that
|x(0)〉〈x(0)|+ |y(0)〉〈y(0)| = 1(0), (4)
with
ρα = (
√
a|x(0)〉+√1− a|y(0)〉)(√a〈x(0)|+√1− a〈y(0)|); (5)
M (0)α (ω
(0)
1 ) = |x(0)〉〈x(0)| and (6)
M (0)α (ω
(0)
2 ) = |y(0)〉〈y(0)| (7)
An alternate explanation β of the probabilities given in (3) asserts an entangled
state. The explanation β involves an additional tensor-product space H(1) = R2,
again a real vector space of dimension 2, with basis vectors {|x(1)〉, |y(1)〉}:
ρβ =
(√
a|x(0)〉|x(1)〉+√1− a|y(0)〉|y(1)〉)(√
a|〈x(0)|〈x(1)|+√1− a〈y(0)|〈y(1)|) (8)
Mβ = M
(0)
α ⊗ 1(1) (9)
7.3. Concept of an explanation involving an infinite string of symbols
Can it make sense to admit explanations expressed as (countably) infinite
strings of symbols? One can view (2) as a mapping from infinite binary sequences
to explanations. Looked at that way, an explanation is then a particular infinite bit
sequence together with the mapping. (The mapping is expressed by a finite num-
ber of symbols (it fits on the page!), but the bit sequence is (countably) infinite.)
What leads us to propose such a form as an explanation is the conceptual sepa-
ration between theory on the blackboard and experimental activity on the work-
bench: we no longer see practical constraints on the workbench as constraining
the forms admissible for theory. A precedent for the lack of constraint is the Tur-
ing machine with its infinite tape.
The separation between explanations on the blackboard and evidence on the
workbench established by the Theorem is already provided by a weaker theorem
in [2] which implies a countable (not an uncountable) set of explanations of given
evidence. This multiplicity shows that wave functions and linear operators cannot
be found on the workbench of evidence, but instead are imaginative entities to be
seen on the blackboard of mathematics. What to make of this separation of expla-
nations from anything that can be seen on the workbench? From a standpoint that
recognize to agency, explanations on the blackboard appear as strings of symbols
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written by agents, and are acceptable entities toward which to devote theoretical
attention. So, if one wants to build a mathematical theory of explanations, what
should be the building blocks?
To choose the “building blocks” for such a theory, it may help to notice the
use of number systems in physics. In that use one tolerates a separation between
the mathematical properties by which number systems are defined and experience
with physical acts of computation. The limited memory of any actual computer
puts a limit on the range of integers that the computer can deal with one-to-one,
so the computer cannot represent the whole set of integers. Instead it represents
a subset of integers, and appends to this subset some way of dealing with under-
flow and overflow. Besides the well-known issue of round-off errors in floating-
point representations of the integers, one gets a second effect, more interesting
for present purposes. For arithmetic operations on some integers x, (x + x) − x
overflows, while x + (x − x) does not overflow, but gives x; the associative law
of addition suffers exceptions. (Try it in Matlab for x = 10308). When dealing
with integers near the limits of the capacity of the computer, a programmer has to
deal with this and other exceptions to the “laws of arithmetic.” Should physicists
use those laws or should they instead use the much more complicated behavior
of expressions of number as actually implementable in computer hardware on
the workbench? For physics, the answer is driven by the drive for elegance and
simplicity: “An important task of the theoretical physicist lies in distinguishing
between trivial and nontrivial discrepancies between theory and experiment.”[23,
p3] The mathematical idea of integers—that every integer has a successor and a
predecessor—so charms the mind that the gap between the mathematically de-
fined integers and their limited realization in computers is no fatal stroke against
their use in the constructing of theory.
Now back to building blocks for a theory of explanations. We start with a
theoretical abstraction, parallel to the that of the integers: in explaining given
evidence, one can always take one more factor into account. Do we accept this
abstraction or not? Were we to hew too closely to what can be realized, we expect
to eventually bog down if we keep trying to add factors realizable on the work-
bench; however, to account for this limitation of the workbench, we must deal
with the vexing question of “what is the maximum number of factors?”, which
depends on the technology on hand and, and so evolves with that technology. For
theoretical purposes we ignore such a limit, which, once done, opens the way to
theoretical portrayals of explanations as in (2).
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7.4. Testing extended explanations
A question was raised about testing extensions of explanations of the form (2).
Before they are extended, those explanations (2) are no harder to test than is the
explanation (1), for the simple reason that all these explanations, with the extra
factors of the POVM set to unit operators (M (n)(Ω(n)) = 1(n)), assert exactly
the same probabilities. The extended explanations obtained by attending to finer
outcomes ω(n) ⊂ Ω(n) for some values of n are testable in principle, to the extent
of selecting any particular factor, say the m-th. To test the extended explanation
with respect to them-th factor, all the factors n 6= m are ignored, as expressed by
unit POVM factors, so that (2) reduces to(
ρ(0) ⊗ ρ(m)jm ,M (0)(ω(0))⊗M (m)(ω(m))
)
, (10)
The trace of (10) is the marginal probability obtained by ignoring outcomes of
all sectors except sector 0 and sectorm, and the distinctions in probability do not
become small asm increases.
7.5. Restriction to finite sets
Some readers may still be uncomfortable with explanations involving infinite
tensor products, so we address what remains of our argument if only finite sets
are admitted. Suppose that we allow only some finite numberN of tensor-product
factors, and, correspondingly, only N extensions of arithmetic. Also, we trun-
cate the Turing tape to make a computer of finite memory capacity. Then there
are 2N extended arithmetics. Similarly, the number of alternative explanations is
≥ 2N . Thus, recording the names of all the alternative explanations or of all the
extended arithmetics places a demand on computer memory that increases expo-
nentially with N . The parallel between Go¨del incompleteness and explanations
is still present in the exponential behaviors, but, with the restriction to finite sets,
the parallel is expressed by complexity, rather than by the (to us) mathematically
more appealing formulation in terms of computability.
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